Abstract-Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks are sophisticated and stealthy, exploiting multiple software vulnerabilities and plaguing many well-protected businesses with significant financial losses. Due to the complexity introduced by numerous installed software applications and the limited visibility into their behaviors, enterprises are seeking solutions to connect and investigate risky software behaviors across software applications. In this demo, we present AIQL, a tool for investigating complex risky software behaviors via interactive queries. To obtain a global view of software behaviors, AIQL is built upon ubiquitous system monitoring, which records interactions among software applications and system resources. In particular, AIQL provides: (1) domain-specific data model and storage for storing the massive system monitoring data, (2) a domain-specific query language, Attack Investigation Query Language, which integrates critical primitives for risky behavior specification, and (3) an optimized query engine based on the characteristics of the data and the query to efficiently schedule the execution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks are sophisticated (involving many individual attack steps across many hosts and exploiting various vulnerabilities) and stealthy (each individual step is not suspicious enough), plaguing many well-protected businesses with significant financial losses [1] . In order for enterprises to counter APT attacks, recent approaches based on ubiquitous system monitoring have emerged as an important solution for monitoring, connecting, and investigating risky software behaviors across software applications [2] - [6] . System monitoring logs record system-level interactions (i.e., system activities) among software applications and system resources (e.g., files, processes, network sockets) as a sequence of system events over time, providing a global view of software behaviors. Collecting system monitoring data enables security analysts to investigate APT attacks by querying risky software behaviors over the historical data.
However, there are two major challenges for building a query tool to support security analysts in effective and efficient attack investigation.
Risky Behavior Specification: The tool needs to provide a query language with specialized constructs for expressing major types of risky software behaviors ( Figure 1 ): (1) Multistep attacks: risky behaviors in advanced attacks typically involve system activities that are related to each other based on either specific attribute (e.g., the same process reads a sensitive file and accesses the network) or temporal relationships (e.g., file read happens before network access), which requires language constructs to easily specify relationships among activities. (2) Dependency tracking of attacks: dependency tracking plays an important role in investigation and is widely used to track causality of data for discovering the "attack entry" [2] , [3] , which requires language constructs to easily chain constraints among activities. (3) Abnormal software behaviors: frequency-based behavioral models are often used to investigate abnormal software behaviors, such as network access spikes [7] , which requires language constructs to easily specify sliding windows and statistical aggregation of activities and compare the aggregate results with either fixed thresholds (in absolute sense) or the historical results (in relative sense).
Timely Big-Data Analysis: Though investigation is a type of post-mortem analysis, it is a considerable time-sensitive task: a timely investigation can help understand the attack sequence, which is crucial to correctly patch the system and prevent the system from further damage. However, system monitoring produces a huge amount of daily logs [4] (∼ 50 GB per day for 100 hosts), and the investigation of APT attacks typically requires the enterprise to keep at least a 0.5 ∼ 1 year worth of data [8] . Such a huge amount of data poses challenges for a timely investigation: the tool needs to provide efficient data storage and query execution scheduling.
Unfortunately, existing query tools do not address both of these inherent challenges. First, existing query languages in relational databases (e.g., PostgreSQL), graph databases (e.g., Neo4j), and other NoSQL databases (e.g., MongoDB, SPARQL) lack explicit constructs to chain constraints among system activities and specify their relationships. To specify a risky software behavior with multiple steps, these tools often generate large queries with many joins and constraints mixed together, posing great challenges for performance tuning. Writing such queries correctly is also time consuming and errorprone. More importantly, none of these tools provide language constructs to express behavioral models with accesses to historical aggregate results. Second, system monitoring data is generated with a timestamp on a specific host in the enterprise, exhibiting strong spatial and temporal properties. However, existing query tools are designed to work with general-purpose data thus missing opportunities for optimizations based on the domain-specific characteristics of system monitoring data, leading to some queries running for hours (e.g., performance evaluation results in Section IV).
To address these challenges, we developed AIQL 1 , a tool that enables security analysts to efficiently investigate risky software behaviors via querying system monitoring data. AIQL includes three major novelties. First, AIQL provides a domainspecific query language, Attack Investigation Query Language, which provides a series of specialized constructs to express the three aforementioned types of risky behaviors. Second, AIQL provides domain-specific data model and storage for scaling the storage. Third, AIQL optimizes the query engine based on the domain-specific characteristics of the data and the semantics of the query to efficiently schedule the query execution. Additionally, our AIQL tool provides a web UI for easily constructing queries and retrieving execution results. Figure 2 shows the architecture of AIQL. AIQL takes a input query from the user (e.g., security analysts) that specifies certain risky behaviors for investigation, executes the query, and returns the matched results to the user. AIQL consists of three components: (1) the data collection agents that are deployed across enterprise hosts collect information about system calls from kernels. The collected system monitoring data is sent to the central server and stored in our optimized data storage; (2) the language parser parses the input query and saves the information for execution; (3) the query execution engine executes the query based on the parsed information and retrieves the matched risky behaviors.
II. AIQL ARCHITECTURE

A. Data Collection and Storage
Data Model: System monitoring records system-level interactions (i.e., system activities) among software applications and system resources (i.e., system entities) as a sequence of system events. Each of the recorded event occurs on a particular host at a particular time, thus exhibiting strong spatial and temporal properties. In our data model, we consider system entities as files, processes, and network connections. We define a system event as the interaction among two system entities represented using the triple subject, operation, object , which consists of the initiator of the interaction, the type of the interaction, and the target of the interaction. Subjects are processes originating from software applications such as Firefox, and objects can 1 More technical details are in our USENIX ATC 2018 paper [5] . be files, processes, and network connections. We categorize system events into three types according to their object entities, namely file events, process events, and network events.
Data Collection: We developed data collection agents based on mature system monitoring frameworks: auditd for Linux, ETW for Windows, DTrace for MacOS. Our agents are deployed across servers, desktops, and laptops in the enterprise and collect critical security-related attributes from system entities and system events (Tables I and II) .
Data Storage: We leverage relational databases (PostgreSQL, Greenplum) to store the collected data. Relational databases come with mature indexing mechanisms and are scalable to massive data. We further optimized the write throughput and data storage by leveraging techniques such as data deduplication and in-memory indexes, batch commit, time and space partitioning, and hypertable.
B. Query Language
We implemented the language parser using ANTLR 4. Our AIQL tool provides a domain-specific language, Attack Investigation Query Language, which uniquely integrates a series of critical primitives for concisely expressing the three major types of risky behaviors (Figure 1 ). We highlight several important primitives using real query examples. For a complete list of grammar rules, please refer to our conference paper [5] .
1) Multievent AIQL query: AIQL provides explicit language constructs for system events, spatial/temporal constraints, and event attribute/temporal relationships. Query 1 shows a multievent query that investigates the data exfiltration on the database server. Lines 1-2 specify two global constraints that restrict the time window and host ID for all events. Lines 3-6 specify four event patterns successively in the format of {subject-operation-object} that describe the logic of the investigated behavior: the attacker leveraged OSQL utility (osql.exe) to dump the database content (backup1.dmp), and ran a malware (sbblv.exe) to send the content dump back to his host (XXX.129). Line 7 specifies the temporal order of the event patterns (i.e., temporal relationships). The use of the same object ID f1 in evt2 and evt3 implicitly indicates that the two event patterns have the same file entity (i.e., attribute relationship). Line 8 specifies the desired attributes of matched events to return and uses syntax shortcuts for conciseness (e.g., p1 → p1.exe_name, f1 → f1.name, i1 → i1.dst_ip).
Query 1: Data exfiltration on the database server
2) Dependency AIQL query: AIQL provides explicit language constructs for chaining constraints among system events in the form of event path. Query 2 shows a forward dependency query that investigates the ramification of a malware (info_stealer), which originated from Host 1 (agentid = 1) and affected Host 2 (agentid = 2) through an Apache web server. An example execution result may show that p3 is the wget process that downloaded the malicious script from Host 2. 
Query 2: Forward tracking for malware ramification
3) Anomaly AIQL query: AIQL provides explicit language constructs for sliding windows, aggregation functions, and accesses to historical aggregate results, which facilitates the specification of frequency-based behavioral models. Query 3 shows an anomaly query that specifies a 1-minute sliding window (Line 3) and computes a moving average (Line 7) to investigate processes on the database server that transfer a large amount of data to a suspicious IP (XXX.129). An example execution result may show that the process p is sbblv.exe, which is suspicious and deserves further investigation. 
C. Query Execution Engine
AIQL provides a query execution engine that leverages domain-specific characteristics of the data and the semantics of the query to efficiently schedule the execution. Optimizing a query with many constraints is a difficult task due to the complexities of joins and constraints. For a multievent query, AIQL addresses this challenge by synthesizing a SQL data query for every event pattern and schedules the execution of these data queries using our optimized scheduling strategy, rather than weaving all the joins and constraints together in a large SQL and relying on the inefficient default SQL engine scheduling. Our optimized scheduling strategy has two key insights (see [5] for further details): (1) for a query with multiple event patterns, we can prioritize the search of event patterns with high pruning power, maximizing the reduction of irrelevant events as early as possible; (2) we can partition the query into independent sub-queries along the temporal (e.g., time window) and spatial (e.g., agent ID) dimensions and execute these sub-queries in parallel.
For a dependency query, the parser compiles it to an equivalent multievent query for execution. For an anomaly query, the engine divides the events into sliding windows based on the timestamp. The engine then computes and maintains the aggregate results and performs the filtering.
III. WEB UI
We developed a web UI based on Apache Tomcat (Figure 3) . Our web UI consists of (1) an input box for constructing AIQL queries, (2) an execution status area to show the query execution time, and (3) an interactive table that visualizes and manages the execution results. Furthermore, our web UI provides rich functionalities to facilitate efficient investigation: (1) syntax highlighting for query construction, (2) syntax checking for query debugging, and (3) sorting and searching for query result management.
IV. DEPLOYMENT AND EVALUATION
We deployed AIQL in NEC Labs America comprising 150 hosts. The deployed server has an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2660 (2.20GHz; 32 cores) and 64 GB RAM. We asked a white hat hacker to perform an APT attack (Figure 4 ) in the deployed environment using known exploits [9] . The attacker first exploits the UnReal IRC server remote code execution vulnerability to create a telnet connection to his host. a2 Malware Infection: The attacker uploads a malware via the connection and waits for the malware to infect other hosts to gain access to the intranet. a3 Privilege Escalation: With the access to the intranet, the attacker leverages other vulnerabilities to escalate his privilege and executes memory dumping tools to obtain administrator credentials. a4 Obtain User Credentials: The attacker uses the credentials to penetrate into the domain controller and executes password dumping tools to obtain all users' credentials. a5 Data Exfiltration: Finally, the attacker penetrates into the database server and dumps the data back to his host.
Investigation Procedure: Our investigation assumes no prior knowledge of the attack. We first constructed an anomaly query and identified a process "powershell.exe" transferred large data to a suspicious external IP "XXX.129" on the database server. We then constructed a multievent query to investigate the files read by this process and identified a database dump file "db.bak". We further investigated the creation process of this dump file and identified "sqlservr.exe", which is a standard SQL server process with verified signature. We also confirmed that the process "powershell.exe" created a connection to the IP "XXX.129" before the data transfer. This completes the investigation of the step a5 for data exfiltration. We followed a similar procedure for investigating other steps. For more details about the APT attack setup and the investigation, including a list of vulnerabilities and tools that we leveraged and a list of constructed queries, please refer to our project website [9] . Evaluation Results: Our investigation used 19 multievent queries and 1 anomaly query, touching 85 GB of data/257 million events. Figure 5 shows the log10-transformed execution time of AIQL queries and the semantically equivalent SQL queries in PostgreSQL. We observe that: (1) PostgreSQL becomes very slow when the query becomes complex (e.g., the SQL query for a5-5 takes 56 minutes to finish). In contrast, all AIQL queries finish within 25 seconds; (2) the total investigation time (i.e., cumulative sum of execution time of all queries) for PostgreSQL is 77 minutes. In contrast, the total investigation time for AIQL is 3.6 minutes, achieving 21x performance speedup. For the query conciseness, SQL queries contain at least 3.0x more constraints, 3.5x more words, and 5.2x more characters (excluding spaces) than AIQL queries. These large SQL queries are verbose to write and error-prone, posing further challenges for constructing queries for a timely investigation.
V. CONCLUSION
We presented AIQL, a tool for investigating risky software behaviors via querying system monitoring data. Compared with existing query tools, AIQL provides a web UI to assist query construction and debugging, and greatly reduces the query execution time.
